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Abstract—In this paper, a new identity-based identifica-
tion scheme based on error-correcting codes is proposed.
Two well known code-based schemes are combined : the
signature scheme by Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier and an
identification scheme by Stern.
A proof of security for the scheme in the Random Oracle
Model is given.
Index Terms—Identification, Identity-based Cryptogra-
phy, Correcting codes, Stern, Niederreiter.
I. Introduction
ONE of the most critical points of public key cryptog-raphy (PKC) is that of the management of the au-
thenticity of the public key. It is the very single point that
anchors public key cryptography to the real world. If no
such a mechanism is provided the consequences are fatal.
In fact, if Alice is able to take Bob’s identity by faking her
own public key as Bob’s one, she would be able to decipher
all messages sent to Bob or to sign any message on behalf
of Bob.
In 1984, Shamir introduced the concept of Identity-based
Public Key Cryptography ID-PKC [27] in order to simplify
the management and the identification of the public key,
which, time passing by, had become more and more com-
plex.
In ID-PKC the public key of an user is obtained from
his identity id on the network. The identity id can be a
concatenation of any publicly known information that sin-
gles out the user : a name, an e-mail, or a phone number,
to name a few. Hence it is not longer necessary to ver-
ify a certificate for the public key nor to access a public
directory to obtain a certificate. At first glance it seems
simple but producing private keys becomes more complex.
In particular a user can not build his own private key by
himself anymore, and it is necessary to introduce a trusted
third party who constructs the private key from the user’s
identity and sends it to the user. This process has to be
done at least once for each user.
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Shamir [27] calls this trusted third party the Key Gen-
eration Center (KGC). The KGC is the owner of a system-
wide secret, thus called the master key. After successfully
verifying (by non-cryptographic means) the identity of the
user, the KGC computes the corresponding user private
key from the master key, the user identity id and a trap-
door function.
Identity-based systems resemble ordinary public-key sys-
tems, in the sense that both involve a private transforma-
tion (i.e. decrypting) as well as a public transformation
(i.e. encrypting). However, in identity-based systems users
do not have explicit public keys. Instead, the public key is
effectively replaced by (or constructed from) a user’s pub-
licly available identity information.
The motivation behind identity-based systems is to cre-
ate a cryptographic system resembling an ideal mail sys-
tem. In this ideal system, knowledge of a person’s name
alone suffices for confidential mailing to that person, and
for signature verification that only that person could have
produced. In such an ideal cryptographic system :
1. users need not exchange neither symmetric keys nor
public keys;
2. public directories (databases containing public keys
or certificates) need not be kept;
3. the services of a trusted authority are needed solely
during a set-up phase (during which users acquire au-
thentic public system parameters).
A drawback in many concrete proposals of identity-based
systems is that the required user-specific identity data in-
cludes additional data, taking the form of an integer or
public data value for instance, denoted DA, beyond an a
priori identity ID. Ideally, DA is not required, as a primary
motivation for identity-based schemes is to eliminate the
need to transmit public keys, to allow truly non-interactive
protocols with identity information itself sufficing as an au-
thentic public key. We will refer to the latter systems as
pure identity-based systems. The issue is less significant in
signature and identification schemes where the public key
of a claimant is not required until receiving a message from
that claimant (in this case DA is easily provided); but in
this case, the advantage of identity-based schemes dimin-
ishes. It is more critical in key agreement and public-key
encryption applications where another party’s public key
is needed at the outset.
In his paper Shamir proposed identity-based signature
and identification systems based on the RSA or Dis-
crete Logarithm problems. The first efficient provably se-
cure identity-based encryption cryptosystem featuring the
above mentioned non-interactive property was proposed in
2001 by Boneh and Franklin [16]. This system is based
on the Weil pairing over certain families of elliptic curves.
The same year, Cocks [10] published a system based on
quadratic residuosity but a rather large message expansion
makes it somewhat inefficient in practice.
Following the paper by Boneh and Franklin, research
on ID-PKC has made great advances and lots of schemes
2 REPRINTED FROM: IEEE TRANS. ON INFORMATION THEORY
have been published, most of them based on elliptic curves
and bilinear pairings, such as identity-based encryption
(IBE) schemes [4], identity-based key agreement schemes
[5], identity-based identification (IBI) or identity-based sig-
nature (IBS) schemes [9], [32], [33]. In 2004 Bellare, Neven
and Namprempre proposed in [1] a general framework de-
riving IBI or IBS from traditional public key-based sig-
nature and identification schemes and they applied it to
concrete known schemes. The resulting systems are not
pure identity-based and only schemes based on number
theoretic problems were considered.
In this paper, we propose and formally study a new IBI
scheme built from error-correcting codes.
Code-based cryptography was introduced by McEliece
[23], a variation of which was later proposed by Niederre-
iter [25]. The idea of using error-correcting codes for iden-
tification purposes is due to Harari [20], followed by Stern
(first protocol) and Girault [17]. But Harari and Girault
protocols were subsequently broken, while Stern’s one was
five-pass and unpractical. At Crypto’93, Stern proposed a
new scheme [30], which is still today the reference in this
area.
For a long time no code-based signature scheme was
known, eventually the first (not yet cryptanalyzed) one was
proposed by Courtois, Finiasz and Sendrier [11] (CFS) in
2001. The basic idea of the CFS signature scheme is to
choose parameters such that an inversion of the otherwise
non-invertible Niederreiter scheme is feasible. This is done
at the cost of a rather large public key when comparing to
other signature schemes. Still signature length is short.
We obtain our new IBI scheme by combining the CFS
signature scheme and the identification scheme by Stern.
The basic idea of our scheme is to start from a Niederreiter-
like problem which can be inverted like in the CFS scheme.
This permits to associate a secret to a random (public)
value obtained from the identity of the user. The secret and
public values are then used for the Stern zero-knowledge
identification scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we in-
troduce notation and definitions, while in Section III we
recall basic facts on code-based cryptography. Section IV
is devoted to describe the public key encryption scheme of
Niederreiter and the signature scheme of Courtois, Finiasz
and Sendrier. The identification protocol of Stern is pre-
sented in Section V, and next our new protocol is described
in Section VI. In Section VII we give a proof of security
for our scheme in the Random Oracle Model [2].
Finally in Section VIII we give concrete parameters and
conclude in Section IX.
Publication info. This is the full version of a previously
publish conference extended abstract [7].
II. Notation and definitions
WE first introduce some notation. If x is a string,then |x| denotes its length, while if S is a set then
|S| denotes its cardinality. If κ ∈ N then 1κ denotes the
string of κ ones.
If S is a set then s
R← S denotes the operation of picking
an element s in S uniformly at random. Unless otherwise
indicated, algorithms are modelled as Probabilistic Poly-
nomial Time (PPT) algorithms. We write A(x, y, . . .) to
indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and
by z ←A(x,y, . . .) we denote the operation of running A
with inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. We
write AO1,O2,...(x,y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm
with inputs x,y, . . . and access to oracles O1,O2, . . . and by
z←AO1,O2,...(x,y, . . .) we denote the operation of running
A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and access to oracles O1,O2, . . .
and letting z be the output.
Provers and verifiers. An interactive algorithm is a
stateful PPT algorithm that on input an incoming message
Min (this is ε if the party is initiating the protocol) and
state information St outputs an outgoing message Mout
and updated state St. The initial state contains the initial
inputs of the algorithm. We say that A accepts if Mout =
acc and rejects if Mout = rej. An interaction between a
prover P and a verifier V, both modelled as interactive
algorithms, ends when V either accepts or rejects. The
expression :
(C, d)← Run[P(p1, . . .)↔ V(v1, . . .)]
denotes that P and V have initiated in an interaction
with inputs p1, . . . and v1, . . . respectively, getting a con-
versation transcript C and a boolean decision d, with 1
meaning that V accepted, and 0 meaning it rejected.
Standard identification schemes. A standard identi-
fication scheme S = (Kg,P,V) consists of three PPT algo-
rithms :
Key generation algorithm Kg takes as input a secu-
rity parameter κ and returns a secret key SK and
a matching public key PK . We use the notation
(SK ,PK )← Kg(1κ).
Interactive identification protocol, where the prover
runs P with initial state SK , while the verifier has ini-
tial state PK . It is required that for all κ ∈ N and valid
key pairs (PK ,SK ), the output by V in any interac-
tion between V (with input PK ) and P (with input
SK ) is acc with probability one.
Standard Signatures. A standard signature scheme
S = (KG,Sign,Vfy) consists of three PPT algorithms :
Key generation algorithm KG takes as input a secu-
rity parameter κ and returns a secret key SK and
a matching public key PK . We use the notation
(SK ,PK )← KG(1κ).
Signing algorithm Sign takes as input a secret key SK
and a messagem. The output is a signature sigSK (m).
This is denoted as sigSK (m)← Sign(SK ,m).
Verification algorithm Vfy takes as input a public key
PK , a message m, and a signature sig = sigSK (m).
The output is 1 if the signature is valid, or 0 otherwise.
We use the notation {0,1}← Vfy(PK ,m,sig) to refer
to one execution of this algorithm.
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The standard security notion for signature schemes is
unforgeability against adaptively-chosen message attacks,
which can be found in [19].
Identity-Based identification. An identity-based
identification scheme IBS = (MKg,UKg,P,V) consists of
four PPT algorithms, as follows :
Master-key generation algorithm MKg takes as in-
put a security parameter κ and returns, on one hand,
the system public parameters mpk and, on the other
hand, the matching master secret key msk , which
is known only to a master entity. It is denoted as
(mpk ,msk)←MKG(1κ).
Key extraction algorithm UKg takes as inputs the
master secret key msk and an identity id ∈ {0,1}∗,
and returns a secret key SK [id ]. We use the notation
SK [id ]← UKg(msk , id).
Interactive identification protocol, where the prover
with identity id runs the interactive algorithm P with
initial state SK [id], and the verifier runs V with initial
state mpk , id.
Security of IBI schemes. An IBI scheme is said to be
secure against impersonation under passive attacks (imp-
pa) if any adversary A= (CP,CV), consisting of a cheating
prover CP and a cheating verifier CV, has a negligible ad-
vantage in the following game :
Setup The challenger takes a security parameter κ and
runs the master key generation algorithm MKg. It gives
mpk to the adversary and keeps the master secret key msk
to itself. It initializes an empty list UKlist.
Phase 1 The adversary issues queries of the form
– User key query 〈IDi〉. The challenger checks whether
there exists an entry (idi,SK [idi]) in the list UK
list.
If this is the case, it retrieves the user secret key
SK [idi]. Otherwise, it runs algorithm UKg to gen-
erate the private key SK [idi] corresponding to idi. It
sends SK [idi] to the adversary. It includes the entry
(idi,SK [idi]) in the list UK
list.
– Conversation query 〈IDi〉. The challenger checks
whether there exists an entry (idi,SK [idi]) in the list
UKlist. If this is the case, it retrieves the user se-
cret key SK [idi]. Otherwise, it runs algorithm UKg
to generate the private key SK [idi] corresponding to
IDi. The challenger returns (C, d) where (C, d) ←
Run[CP(SK [idi])↔ V(mpk , idi)].
These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each
query may depend on the answers obtained to the previous
queries.
Challenge The cheating verifier CV outputs a target
identity id⋆ and its state StCV, such that the private key
for id⋆ was not requested in Phase 1.
Phase 2 The cheating prover CP, with input StCV, in-
teracts with a honest verifier with input mpk , id⋆. The
cheating prover is allowed to query the same oracles as
in Phase 1, except that the query id⋆ is not allowed. Fi-
nally, A wins if the output of V is accept, i.e. d = 1 in
(C,d)←Run[CP(SK [idi])↔ V(mpk , idi)].
Such an adversary is called an imp-pa adversary A, and
its advantage is defined as Advimp−pa
IBI ,A (1
ℓ) = Pr[d= 1].
III. Code-based cryptography
IN this section we recall basic facts about code-basedcryptography. We refer to the work of Sendrier [26] for
a general introduction to these problems.
A. Hard problems
Every public key cryptosystem relies on
a hard problem. In the case of coding theory, the main
hard problems used are the Bounded Decoding (BD) and
Code Distinguishing (CD) problems.
Definition III.1 (Bounded Decoding Problem) Let
n and k be two integers such that n ≥ k and H a parity
check matrix. Binary(n, k) represents a random binary
matrix of n columns, k rows and of rank k.
Input : H
R← Binary(n,k) and s R← Fn−k2
Ouput : A word e ∈ Fn2 such that wt(e)≤ n−klog
2
n and
HeT = s
Let us denote by AdvBDC (n,k) the probability that an algo-
rithm C has in solving the above problem.
This problem was proven to be NP-complete in [3].
Definition III.2 (Code Distinguishing Problem)
Let n and k be two integers such that n ≥ k and H a
parity check matrix.
Input : H
R← Goppa(n,k) or H R← Binary(n,k).
Ouput : b = 1 if H ∈ Goppa(n,k), b= 0 otherwise.
AdvCDD (n,k) =
∣∣Pr[D(H) = 1 |H R← Goppa(n,k)]
−Pr[D(H) = 1 |H R← Binary(n,k)]
∣∣.
The description of a Goppa code Goppa(n,k) of length
n and dimension k is to be found in [22].
B. McEliece scheme
[Key Generation] Let C be a q-ary linear code t-
correcting of length n and of dimension k. We denote
C(n, k, d) a such code. Let G a generator matrix of C.
We will use an G′ matrix such that :
G′ = SHP
{
S is invertible
P is a permutation matrix
G′ is public and its decomposition and a syndrome decod-
ing algorithm for C are secret. To be clearer, we recall the
various sizes of the matrices :
S is n− k×n− k, H is n×n− k, P is n×n.
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[Encryption] Let Eq,n,t bet the space of F
n
q words with
Hamming weight t. For a chosen cleartext x ∈ Eq,n,t,
y is the cryptogram corresponding to x if and only if
y = xG′+ e.
[Decryption] For y = xG′+e, the knowledge of the secret
key allows :
1. to compute u= yP−1, ;
2. to find u′ from u thanks to a syndrome decoding al-
gorithm;
3. to find x= u′S−1.
The syndrome decoding algorithm can be, for instance,
in the case of Goppa’s codes, Patterson’s algorithm (see
part A).
C. Cryptanalytic Attacks
The security of code-based cryptosystems depends on
the difficulty of the following two attacks :
(i) Structural Attack : Recover the secret transforma-
tion and the description of the secret code(s) from the
public matrix.
(ii) Ciphertext-Only Attack : Recover the original mes-
sage from the ciphertext and the public key.
C.1 Structural Attack
While no efficient algorithm for decomposing G′ into
(S,G,P ) has been discovered yet [24], a structural attack
has been discovered in [21]. This attack reveals part of the
structure of a so-called weak G′ where ’weak’ means that
G′ has been generated from a binary Goppa polynomial
in a special manner. However, this attack can be avoided
simply by not using such weak public keys.
Structural attacks aim at recovering the structure of the
permuted code, i.e. recovering the permutation from the
code and its permuted version. The underlying problem is
the equivalence of codes. This problem was considered by
Sendrier for which he gave a nice solution : the Support
Splitting Algorithm [26].
The complexity of this algorithm is in
O(2dimension(C∩C⊥)) where C⊥ is the dual of the code
C. This means that in order to resist the attack one gets
two options : either starting from a large family of codes
with arbitrary small hulls (the intersection of C and C⊥)
or starting from a small family of codes but with a large
hull.
For instance the choice of Goppa codes corresponds to
the first possibility.
C.2 Ciphertext-Only Attack
A first analysis using the Information-Set-Decoding was
done by McEliece, then by Lee and Brickell, Stern and
Leon and lastly by Canteaut and Chabaud (see [6] for all
references).
The Information-Set-Decoding Attack is one of the
known general attacks (i.e., not restricted to specific codes)
and seems to have the lowest complexity.
One tries to recover the k information symbols as fol-
lows : the first step is to pick k of the n coordinates ran-
domly in the hope that none of the k are in error. We
then try to recover the message by solving the k×k linear
system (binary or over Fq). Let G
′
k, ck and zk denote the k
columns picked from G′, c and z, respectively. They have
the following relationship
ck = mG
′
k + zk.
If zk = 0 and G
′
k is non-singular, m can be recovered by
m = ckG
′−1
k .
The computation cost of this version is T (k)× Pn,k,t,
where
Pn,k,t = Π
k−1
i=0 (1 −
t
n− i ).
The quantity T (k) in the average work factor is the num-
ber of operations required to solve a k× k linear system
over Fq. As mentioned in [23], solving a k× k binary sys-
tem takes about k3 operations. Over Fq, it would require
at least (k× log2 q)3 operations.
All the papers which improve the complexity only im-
pact the cost of the Gaussian elimination. In the best
improvement by Canteaut and Chabaud [6] a good ap-
proximation of the cost besides the probability factor can
be taken roughly in (k× log2 q)2.
Apart from these general attacks there are some attacks
targeting McEliece cryptosystem using specific codes(see
[28], [21], [4], [13] for exemple).
IV. Signature scheme of Courtois, Finiasz and
Sendrier (or CFS scheme)
BEFORE describing the CFS scheme we first recall theNiederreiter public key cryptosystem.
A. Niederreiter encryption scheme
[Key Generation] Let C be a binary linear code t-
correcting of length n and of dimension k. Let H a parity
check matrix of C. We will use an H˜ matrix such that :
H˜ = QHP
{
Q is invertible
P is a permutation matrix
H˜ is public and its decomposition and a syndrome decod-
ing algorithm for C are secret.
To be clearer, we recall the various sizes of the matrices :
Q is n− k×n− k, H is n×n− k, P is n×n.
Let Eq,n,t bet the space of F
n
q words with Hamming
weight t.
[Encryption] For a chosen cleartext x in Eq,n,t, y is the
cryptogram corresponding to x if and only if y = H˜xT .
[Decryption] For y = H˜xT , the knowledge of the secret
key allows :
1. to compute Q−1y (=HPxT );
CGGG: IMPROVED IDENTITY-BASED IDENTIFICATION USING CORRECTING CODES 5
2. to find PxT from Q−1y thanks to a syndrome decod-
ing algorithm;
3. to find x applying P−1 to PxT .
The syndrome decoding algorithm can be, for instance, in
the case of Goppa’s codes, Patterson’s algorithm (see part
A).
The McEliece or the Niederreiter schemes are not natu-
rally invertible, i.e. if one starts from a random element y
of Fn2 and a code C[n,k,d] that we are able to decode up
to d/2, it is almost sure that we won’t be able to decode
y into a codeword of C. This comes from the fact that the
density of the whole space that is decodable is very small.
B. CFS signature scheme
The idea of the CFS scheme is to find parameters
[n, k, d] that make successful the strategy of picking up
random elements until one is able to decode it with high
probability. More precisely, given M a message to sign
and h a hash-function with range {0, 1}n−k, we try to
find a way to build s ∈ Fn2 of given weight t such that
h(M) = H˜sT . For Decode(·) a decoding algorithm, the
CFS scheme works as follows :
[Key Generation]
1. Select n, k and t according to the security parameter
κ.
2. Pick a random parity check matrix H˜ of a (n, k)-
binary Goppa code decoding t errors.
3. Choose a random (n−k)×(n−k) non-singular matrix
Q, a random n×n permutation matrix P and a hash-
function h : {0,1}∗ −→ Fn−k2 .
4. The public key is H = QH˜P and the private key is
(Q,H˜,P ).
5. Set t= n−klog
2
n , i = 0.
[Sign]
1. i← i+1
2. x′ =Decode eH
(
Q−1h(m‖i))
3. if no x′ was found go to 1
4. output (i,x′P )
[Verify] Compute s′ =Hx′
T
and s = h(m‖i). The signa-
ture is valid if s and s′ are equal.
We get at the end an {s,j} couple, such that :
h(M ⊕ j) = H˜sT .
Let us notice that we can suppose that s has weight
t = [d/2]. In [12], a proof of security in the Random Or-
acle Model for a modified version of the CFS scheme is
given. We use the modified CFS scheme described there,
and named as mCFS, as a building block for our scheme.
The mCFS scheme is explained next.
C. Modified CFS signature scheme
[Key Generation]
1. Select n, k and t according to κ.
2. Pick a random parity check matrix H˜ of a (n, k)-
binary Goppa code decoding t errors.
3. Choose a random (n−k)×(n−k) non-singular matrix
Q, a random n×n permutation matrix P and a hash-
function h : {0,1}∗ −→ Fn−k2 .
4. The public key is H = QH˜P and the private key is
(Q,H˜,P ).
5. Set t= n−klog
2
n .
[Sign]
1. i
R← {1, . . . ,2n−k}
2. x′ =Decode eH
(
Q−1h(m‖i))
3. if no x′ was found go to 1
4. output (i,x′P )
[Verify]Compute s′ = Hx′
T
and s = h(m‖i). The signa-
ture is valid if s and s′ are equals.
V. Stern’s protocol
STERN’S scheme is an interactive zero-knowledge pro-tocol which aims at enabling a prover P to identify
himself to a verifier V.
Let n and k be two integers such that n ≥ k. Stern’s
scheme assumes the existence of a public (n−k)×nmatrix
H˜ defined over the two elements field F2. It also assumes
that an integer t ≤ n has been chosen. For security rea-
sons (discussed in [30]) it is recommended that t is chosen
slightly below the so-called Gilbert-Varshamov bound (see
[22]). The matrix H˜ and the weight t are protocol parame-
ters and may be used by several (even numerous) different
provers
Each prover P receives a n-bit secret key SK (also de-
noted by s if there is no ambiguity about the prover) of
Hamming weight t and computes a public identifier PK
such that iP = H˜SK
T . This identifier is calculated once
in the lifetime of H˜ and can thus be used for several iden-
tifications. When a user P needs to prove to V that he is
indeed the person associated to the public identifier PK ,
then the two protagonists perform the following protocol
where h denotes a standard hash-function :
[Commitment Step] P randomly chooses y ∈ Fn2 and a
permutation σ of {1,2, . . . ,n}. Then P sends to V the com-
mitments c1, c2 and c3 such that :
c1 = h(σ‖H˜yT ); c2 = h(σ(y)); c3 = h(σ(y ⊕ SK )),
where h(a‖b) denotes the hash of the concatenation of the
sequences a and b.
[Challenge Step] V sends b ∈ {0,1,2} to P .
[Answer Step] Three possibilities :
• if b= 0 : P reveals y and σ.
• if b= 1 : P reveals (y⊕ SK ) and σ.
• if b= 2 : P reveals σ(y) and σ(SK ).
[Verification Step] Three possibilities :
• if b= 0 : V verifies that c1, c2 are correct.
• if b= 1 : V verifies that c1, c3 are correct.
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• if b = 2 : V verifies that c2, c3 are correct, and that
the weight of σ(s) is t.
[Soundness Amplification Step] Iterate the above steps
until the expected security level is reached.
During the fourth Step, when b equals 1, it can be no-
ticed that H˜yT derives directly from H˜(y⊕SK )T since we
have :
H˜yT = H˜(y ⊕ SK )T ⊕ PK = H˜(y ⊕ SK )T ⊕ H˜SK T .
As proved in [30], the protocol is zero-knowledge and for
a round iteration, the probability that a dishonest person
succeeds in cheating is (2/3). Therefore, to get a confi-
dence level of β, the protocol must be iterated a number
of times k such that (2/3)k ≤ β holds. When the number
of iterations satisfies the last condition, then the security
of the scheme relies on the NP complete problem SD.
By virtue of the so-called Fiat-Shamir Paradigm [15],
it is possible to convert Stern’s Protocol into a signature
scheme, but the resulting signature size is long (about 140-
kbit long for 280 security). Notice that this is large in
comparison with classical signature schemes, but it is more
or less close to the size of many files currently used in
everyday life.
VI. New Identity-based identification scheme
from Stern-Niederreiter protocols
WE describe now the first code-based identity-basedidentification method. The prover is identifying her-
self to the verifier. Let idS , idP be the prover and of the
identifier identities respectively.
[Master key generation] Let C, H, H˜ = QHP the out-
put of the key generation algorithm of the CFS signature
scheme in Section IV. Let h a hash function mapping to
{0,1}n−k. H˜ is made public, but the decomposition of H˜
is a secret of the authority.
[Key extraction] On inputs the the decomposition
of H˜ and the user’s identity idP the goal of the key
extraction algorithm is to output s ∈ Eq,n,t such that
h(idP ) = H˜s
T . However h(idP ) might not be in the
target of x → H˜xT . That is to say that h(idP ) is not
necessarily in the space of decodable elements of Fn2 . That
problem can be solved thanks to the following algorithm.
Given Decode(·) a decoding algorithm for the hidden code :
1. i
R← {1, . . . ,2n−k}
2. x′ =Decode eH
(
Q−1h(idP ‖i)
)
3. If no x′ was found go to 1
4. output (i,x′P )
We get at the end a couple {s, j}, such that
h(idP ‖j) = H˜sT . We can note that we have s of
weight t or less.
[Interactive identification] We use a slight derivation
of Stern’s protocol. We suppose that the prover obtained
a couple {s, j} verifying h(idP ‖j) = H˜sT . h(idP ‖j) is
set to be the prover’s public key. Identification is then
performed by modifying Stern’s protocol with respect to
the public key h(idP ‖j). Details follow.
[Commitment Step] P chooses randomly any word y
of n bits and a permutation σ of {1,2, . . . ,n}. Then P sends
to S : c1, c2, c3, j such that :
c1 = h(σ‖H˜yT ); c2 = h(σ(y)); c3 = h(σ(y ⊕ s))
[Challenge Step] S sends b ∈ {0,1,2} to P .
[Answer Step] Three possibilities :
• if b= 0 : P reveals y and σ.
• if b= 1 : P reveals (y⊕ s) and σ.
• if b= 2 : P reveals σ(y) and σ(s)
[Verification Step] Three possibilities :
• if b= 0 : S verifies that the c1, c2 received at the second
round are correct.
• if b = 1 : S verifies that the c1, c3 received at the
second round are correct. For c1 we can note that
H˜yT derives directly from H˜(y⊕ s)T by :
H˜yT = H˜(y ⊕ s)T ⊕ H˜sT
• if b = 2 : S verifies that the c2, c3 received at the
second round have really been honestly calculated,
and that the weight of s.σ is t.
[Soundness Amplification Step] Iterate the commit-
ment, challenge, answer and verification steps until the ex-
pected security is reached.
Thanks to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [15] it is possible to
derive an identity-based signature scheme from the above
identity-based identification scheme. Since this is a well-
known cryptographic result, we refer the reader to [15], [1]
for details.
VII. Proving Security of mCFS-Stern IBI scheme
Theorem 1 The IBI scheme from Section VI is secure in
the sense of imp-pa if the BD and CD problems are hard
to solve.
Proof: A security reduction is obtained by adapting
the proofs by Dallot [12] and Stern [31] to our setting. We
build the proof following a sequence of games Game 0,
Game 1, . . . Game 0 is the original attack game, i.e the
standard imp-pa game. Successive games are obtained by
small modifications of the preceding games, in such a way
that the difference of the adversarial advantage in consec-
utive games is easily quantifiable. To compute this differ-
ence, the following lemma is used :
Lemma 1 Let Xi,Xi+1, B be events defined in some prob-
ability distribution, and suppose that Xi ∧ ¬B ⇔ Xi+1 ∧
¬B. Then |Pr [Xi]−Pr [Xi+1] | ≤ Pr [B].
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Let qh, qE , qC denote the maximum number of queries
that adversary A makes to the hash, user keys and conver-
sation oracles.
We want to show there exists adversaries C,D that break
the BD and CD problems respectively.
To answer hash, user key and conversation queries, three
lists hlist,UKlist and Λ are maintained. If there is no value
associated with an entry in a list, we denote its output
by ⊥. The list hlist consists of tuples of the form (x, s)
indexed by (id, i), where i is an index in {1, . . . ,2n−k}, id
is an identity, and H˜sT = x = h(id, i) if x 6=⊥6= s. The
list UKlist, consists of entries of the form (id,sk[id]). The
list Λ contains indexes Λ(m) associated to a message m,
for which the simulator is able to produce a signature on
h(m,Λ(m)).
Game 0. This the standard imp-pa game. The mas-
ter public and secret keys are obtained by running algo-
rithm GenmCFS(1
κ) In particular, the master public key
H˜ = QHP plus a hash-function h : {0,1}∗ → Fn−k2 , and
the master secret key is (Q,H,P ), where H
R← Goppa(n,k),
Q is a non-singular (n−k)×(n−k) matrix and P is a n×n
permutation matrix. Therefore Pr [X0] = Adv
imp−pa
IBI ,A .
Game 1.(Simulation of hash and user key queries) We
change the way in which hash and user key extraction
queries are answered. For hash queries of the form (id, i),
there are two situations, depending on whether i = Λ(id).
If this is the case, a decodable syndrome x= H˜sT is given
as the output, and the corresponding code-word s is stored,
i.e. hlist is updated with (x, s) in the entry indexed by
(id, i). If i 6= Λ(id) hash queries are simulated by taking a
random element in Fn−k2 , and then these queries are dis-
tributed as with a random oracle. Details are shown in
Figure 1.
On the other hand, user key queries on id are answered
by choosing the special index Λ(id) at random, calling the
hash oracle on (id,Λ(id)) and outputting (s, i) as the re-
sulting user secret key. Details are shown in Figure 2.
At the end of the simulation, the random oracle h has
output qh + qE + 1 syndromes. Some of them are pro-
duced with the special index i = Λ(id); these syndromes
are not distributed uniformly at random in Fn−k2 , instead
they have been modified as to enable responding user se-
cret key queries. It might be then the case that adversary
A queried h on some pair (id, j) such that later j is set
to Λ(id). This will cause an incoherence, since then the
output h(id, j) will be a random syndrome, instead of a
decodable syndrome. The latter happens with probability
at most qE2n−K (the indexes Λ(id) are only defined when
answering key extraction queries). Therefore,
|Pr[X0]− Pr[X1]| ≤ qE
2n−k
Game 2.(Changing the master key generation algorithm)
The key generation algorithm is changed so that H ←
Binary(n,k). Then,
|Pr[X2]− Pr[X1]| ≤ AdvCDD (n)
where D is an algorithm that simulates the environment of
Game 2 for A if H ← Goppa(n,k) and outputs d = 1 if A
successfully impersonates the target identity id⋆, and d= 0
otherwise; and D simulates the environment of Game 3 for
A if H ← Binary(n,k) and outputs d = 1 if A successfully
impersonates the target identity id⋆, and d= 0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that
Pr[H
R← Goppa(n, k) : D(H) = 1] = Pr[X2].
and
Pr[H
R← Binary(n, k) : D(H) = 1] = Pr[X3].
Input: A pair (id, i)
Output: A syndrome s
(s,x)← hlist(m,i);
if i 6= Λ(id) then
if s=⊥ then
x
R← Fn−k2 ;
hlist(id, i)← (x,⊥);
end
return h(id, i) = x;
else
if x=⊥ then
s
R←{w ∈ Fn2 |wt(w) ≤ t};
x← H˜sT ;
hlist(id, i)← (x,s);
end
return h(id, i) = x;
end
Fig. 1 - Simulation of hash queries
Input: An identity id
Output: A user secret key
(s, id)
if Λ(id) =⊥ then
Λ(id)
R← {1, . . . ,2n−k};
end
(x,s)← h(id,Λ(id));
i← Λ(id);
Λ(id)←⊥;
return sk[id] = (s, i);
Fig. 2 - Simulation of user key queries
Game 3.(Guessing the target identity) A random index
j+
R←{1, . . . ,qh+ qE+ qC} is taken. The j+-th hash query
(id+, i+) to is set to be Q(x+)T , where x+
R← Fn−k2 , i.e.
h(id+, i+) = Q(x+)T . The probability space is not modi-
fied, since x+
R← Fn−k2 and Q is non-singular, and therefore
Pr[X3] = Pr[X2].
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Game 4.(Abort the game)
Let (id⋆, i⋆) be the target identity and target index that
A impersonates. If id⋆ 6= id+ or i⋆ 6= i+ then the challenger
aborts the game. Since Game 4 is obtained by conditioning
Game 3 on an independent event of probability 1qH+qE+1
we obtain
Pr[X4] =
Pr[X3]
qH + qE + 1
Game 5. (Answering conversation queries on the tar-
get identity id⋆) We have to answer conversation queries
on id⋆ without knowing the code word s⋆ correspond-
ing to h(id⋆, i⋆) = x⋆, i.e. s⋆ such that x⋆ = H˜s+ and
x⋆ = Q(x+)T . We can answer these queries in expected
polynomial time by using the algorithm in Theorem 3
in [31]. Roughly, the algorithm uses a resettable simu-
lation [18]. At the beginning of each iteration of the basic
identification protocol, the algorithm chooses at random
one out of three cheating strategies, where each strategy
allows to successfully interact with a cheating verifier CV
with probability 2/3. In case the algorithm can not suc-
cessfully interact with CV, it resets the adversaryA for the
current round (see [31] for details). All in all, the proba-
bility space is not modified, and then Pr[X5] = Pr[X4].
Theorem 1 in [31] implies that an adversary A imper-
sonating the user with identity id⋆ when running k rounds
of the basic protocol and with advantage (2/3)k+ ǫ1 for a
non-negligible ǫ1 > 0, can be converted into a PPT algo-
rithm computing s⋆ such that H˜(s⋆)T = x⋆ with probabil-
ity ǫ31/10. A basic calculation shows that (s
+)T = P (s⋆)T is
a solution to the BD problem with inputs H
R← Binary(n,k)
and x+
R← Fn−k2 . Let C be an algorithm that simulates
Game 5 for the impersonating adversary A using the in-
put of the BD problem. Then,
AdvBDC ≥
(
Pr[X5]− (2/3)k
)3
10
Collecting all the probabilities
(2/3)k+ ǫ ≤ Advimp−pa
IBI ,A
≤ qE
2n−k
+AdvCDD (n)+Pr[X5](qh+ qE +1)
≤ qE
2n−k
+AdvCDD (n)+(
(AdvBDC )
1/3 +(2/3)k
)
101/3(qh+ qE +1)
and then
ǫ ≤ qE
2n−k
+AdvCDD (n)+(
(AdvBDC )
1
3 +(1− 1
3
√
10
)(
2
3
)k
)
10
1
3 (qh+ qE +1)
The latter equation can be read as follows : a successful
impersonating adversary with advantage (23 )
k+ ǫ implies a
successful adversary against the BD or CD problems.
VIII. Efficiency Analysis
WE deal here with the security our protocol and itspracticality. Let us remind that in the case of
Niederreiter’s cryptosystem, its security relies on the hard-
ness of decoding of a linear code (see section III).
A. Parameters and security of the scheme
The protocol has two parts : in the first part one inverts
the syndrome decoding problem for a matrix H˜ in order
to construct a private key for the prover and in second
part one applies Stern identification protocol with the same
matrix H˜ . This shows that the overall parameters of the
scheme are equivalent to the security of the CFS scheme,
since the security of the Stern scheme with the same matrix
parameters is implicitly included in the signature scheme.
In particular the scheme has to fulfill two imperative
conditions :
1. make the computation of {s, j} (defined in advance)
difficult without the knowledge of the description of
H,
2. make the number of trials to determine the correct j
not too important in order to reduce the cost of the
computation of s.
Following [11] the Goppa [2m, 2m − tm, t] codes are a
large class of codes which are compatible with condition
2. Indeed, for such a code, the proportion of the decod-
able syndromes is about 1/t! (which is a relatively good
proportion). We also have to choose a relatively small t.
The {s, j} production process will thus be iterated,
about t! times before finding the correct j. But each it-
eration forces to compute D(h(idP ‖j)).
The decoding of the Goppa codes consists of :
• computing a syndrome : t2m2/2 binary operations;
• computing a locator polynomial : 6t2m binary oper-
ations;
• computing its roots : 2t2m2 binary operations.
We thus get a total cost for the computation of the
prover’s private key of about :
t!t2m2(1/2 + 2 + 6/m) binary operations
The cost of an attack by decoding thanks to the split
syndrome decoding is estimated to : 2tm(1/2+o(1)).
The choice of parameters will have to be pertinent
enough to conciliate cost and security. Although less im-
portant, some sizes have also to remain reasonable : the
length of {s,j}, the cost of the verification and the size of
H˜ that is for a Goppa code : 2mtm.
Following [11] we can for example take t= 9 andm= 16.
The cost of the signature stays then relatively reasonable
for a security of about 280. The others sizes remain in that
context very acceptable.
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B. Practical values
The big difference when using the parameters associated
to the CFS scheme is that the code used is very long, 216
against 29 for the basic Stern scheme, it dramatically de-
velops communication costs.
In the next table we sum up for the parameters m= 16,
t= 9 the general parameters of the IBI and IBS schemes.
public key private key matrix size
tm tm 2mtm
144 144 1 Mo
communication cost key generation
≈ 2m×#rounds
500 Ko (58 rounds) 1 s
Practical values for the IBI scheme : m= 16, t= 9
signature length key generation
≈ 2m×#rounds
2.2 Mo (280 rounds) 1 s
Practical values for the IBS scheme : m= 16, t= 9
Reduction of the size of the public matrix : At the
difference of a pure signature scheme in which one wants
to be able to sign fast, in our scheme the signature is only
computed once for sending it to the prover, hence the time
for signing may be judged less determinant and a longer
time of signature may be accepted at the cost of reducing
(a little) the parameters of the public matrix.
IX. Conclusion
IN this paper we present and prove secure a new identity-based identification scheme based on error-correcting
codes. Our scheme combines two well known schemes by
Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier and Stern. It inherits some of
their practical weaknesses, such as large system parame-
ters. Interestingly the new scheme is one of the very few
existing alternatives to number theory for identity-based
cryptography, and we hope that it boosts future research
on this area.
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